From New Zealand Artillery in the Field, 1914-18, one week before the attack on Messines Ridge, things turn more brutal and incessant. When one thinks of how many wars of various scales have been waged since these events 100 years ago - it is such an incredible waste of machine power and human lives:
On the last day in May most of the batteries spent some time cleaning up uncut wire in their zones, and by the end of the day all the wire within wire-cutting range in group zones was reported cut. From 6 a.m. this day onwards fire was maintained continuously, day and night, on all roads, bridges, communication trenches, light railway junctions, and transport halting places on the front. Thus there was no road or approach by which the enemy could transport stores or ammunition, or bring up reliefs for his weary and harassed infantry without being subject to this incessant and destructive fire. What mental and physical agony this meant when prolonged for over a week may readily be conjectured. The enemy guns were very active during the night of June 1, Hyde Park Corner, where there was always much traffic, being persistently shelled. A practice barrage with 75 per cent. of the guns only, was fired on June 2nd, and the same night the German positions in front of Messines were liberally gas-shelled. The weather continued bright and warm, and practice barrages were fired again on the 3rd and 5th. On the 3rd enemy planes were active low down over battery positions and Ploegsteert Wood was heavily shelled; but on the 5th hostile fire was particularly severe and effective. The positions of three batteries of the 311th Brigade, R.F.A., which were attached to "G" Group, were shelled practically all day. About 1,300 rounds of ammunition were destroyed, and the position was almost burnt out. The personnel were withdrawn, but returned at 3 p.m. to take part in the corps practice barrage. Two minutes after this practice barrage started the men of one battery had to evacuate the position, owing to the danger from burning ammunition dumps in rear. All the rations and stores were destroyed, and the exploding ammunition put no fewer than five guns out of action. On the following day "G" Group did not fire as the positions, several of which were very exposed, were still being shelled at intervals, and it was not desired to give them completely away before the attack.
From June 1st the daily expenditure of ammunition had been 150 rounds per gun and howitzer, and this expenditure continued right up to the day of attack. Prior to the assault there was to be no intense bombardment and no departure from what had been for some time the normal and customary procedure in the daily and nightly attention given to the enemy. It was a critical moment in the consummation of the scheme—the hour preceding its tumultuous birth—and anything that might give the vigilant German mind any idea of the hour of the attack was to be rigorously avoided. "It is essential," said the order on the subject, "that there should be no increase or slackening in the rate of fire before zero hour, and that everything should appear normal." Such was the density of the smoke and dust resulting from the ceaseless shelling of the enemy front that the whole countryside was completely hidden from aerial observation. A cessation of fire was in consequence ordered for fifteen minutes each day, to allow aeroplane photographs to be taken.
