As New Zealand History online says, "Passchendaele has been a byword for the horror of
the Great War. In terms of lives lost in a single day, the failed attack
on Bellevue Spur on 12 October was probably the greatest disaster in
New Zealand’s history." The day left 843 New Zealand soldiers dead or mortally wounded, and a total of 2730 casualties (killed or wounded).
I have been following the lead-up to the battle in New Zealand Artillery in the Field, 1914-18. As many will know, heavy rain in early October had left the area a muddy quagmire - providing atrocious conditions, and difficulty moving men, machines and animals. New Zealand History online says, "An attack on 9 October by British and Australian troops was to open the way for II ANZAC Corps to capture Passchendaele on the 12th. The plan failed. Without proper preparation and in the face of strong German resistance, the 9 October attack collapsed with heavy casualties."
From the moment the attack opened, the artillery barrage was weak and patchy as a direct result of the conditions under which the guns had to shoot; but this deficiency, though serious in itself, was not the chief factor in the tragic failure. The primary causes of the failure of the attack were the deep and continuous belts of uncut wire which faced the attacking infantry, and the massive concrete blockhouses, or pill-boxes, from which the enemy machine gunners shot down everything that moved. In short, it was lack of preparation. The Division was supported in the attack, in addition to heavy artillery, by eight brigades of field artillery, which totalled one hundred and forty-four 18-prs. and forty-eight 4.5in. howitzers. Some of these were still blocked on the road when the attack opened, and in the case of those that had reached the forward positions, the ground was so soft and water-logged that the guns simply sank up to the axles after the first few shots had been fired, and in some cases before a shot had been fired. The provision of stable platforms is an essential to good shooting at any time; but on the 12th it was only by desperate expedients that guns were kept in action at all. All the New Zealand batteries fired in the barrage; the gunners secured logs, odd bits of timber, anything, in fact, that would provide a foundation, and so contrived to keep their guns in action. ...
Despite the fact that the artillery was almost reduced to total immobility and that even movement on foot was a matter of extreme difficulty, orders were actually issued to certain batteries about this time regarding the provision of mobile sections of 18-prs. in readiness to co-operate in case of a rapid advance on the front by cavalry. And this at a time when even unburdened animals became so hopelessly bogged that extrication became impossible and they had to be destroyed.
Fortunately, "the opportunity of assisting the cavalry in a "rapid advance" never arose."
I have been following the lead-up to the battle in New Zealand Artillery in the Field, 1914-18. As many will know, heavy rain in early October had left the area a muddy quagmire - providing atrocious conditions, and difficulty moving men, machines and animals. New Zealand History online says, "An attack on 9 October by British and Australian troops was to open the way for II ANZAC Corps to capture Passchendaele on the 12th. The plan failed. Without proper preparation and in the face of strong German resistance, the 9 October attack collapsed with heavy casualties."
Yet despite this, and the weather conditions becoming worse, "orders
were at once issued for a renewal of the attack on the 12th, and
instructions concerning the artillery support were received by the New
Zealand Brigades on the afternoon of the 10th," according to New Zealand Artillery in the Field (published in 1922). It went on to sum up the situation on the 11 October:
Apart from the difficulties of haulage, the constant blocking of the
roads by heavy guns caused a great deal of delay, and hung up the
transport of ammunition as well as the moving of the guns. Only a small
percentage of the guns had been brought forward, and they were without
platforms to keep them from sinking in the mud. The situation was
distinctly unpromising, but all had been done that was humanly possible
in the time and under the conditions. The situation was such, however,
that Brigadier-General Johnston, C.R.A. of the New Zealand Division,
reported to both the Divisional and Corps Commanders that they could not
depend on the artillery for the attack on the following day.
The account of the day is headed 'The Tragedy of October 12th", and includes:
Very heavy casualties had been suffered by both Brigades of Infantry
which took part in the attack; the losses in killed and wounded numbered
2730. Communications were utterly disorganised, the greatest difficulty
was experienced in getting rations and water to the men in the forward
areas, and the condition of the wounded was pitiable in the extreme.
Many lay all night in the mud, exposed to the hail and rain and the
bitter cold....From the moment the attack opened, the artillery barrage was weak and patchy as a direct result of the conditions under which the guns had to shoot; but this deficiency, though serious in itself, was not the chief factor in the tragic failure. The primary causes of the failure of the attack were the deep and continuous belts of uncut wire which faced the attacking infantry, and the massive concrete blockhouses, or pill-boxes, from which the enemy machine gunners shot down everything that moved. In short, it was lack of preparation. The Division was supported in the attack, in addition to heavy artillery, by eight brigades of field artillery, which totalled one hundred and forty-four 18-prs. and forty-eight 4.5in. howitzers. Some of these were still blocked on the road when the attack opened, and in the case of those that had reached the forward positions, the ground was so soft and water-logged that the guns simply sank up to the axles after the first few shots had been fired, and in some cases before a shot had been fired. The provision of stable platforms is an essential to good shooting at any time; but on the 12th it was only by desperate expedients that guns were kept in action at all. All the New Zealand batteries fired in the barrage; the gunners secured logs, odd bits of timber, anything, in fact, that would provide a foundation, and so contrived to keep their guns in action. ...
Despite the fact that the artillery was almost reduced to total immobility and that even movement on foot was a matter of extreme difficulty, orders were actually issued to certain batteries about this time regarding the provision of mobile sections of 18-prs. in readiness to co-operate in case of a rapid advance on the front by cavalry. And this at a time when even unburdened animals became so hopelessly bogged that extrication became impossible and they had to be destroyed.
Fortunately, "the opportunity of assisting the cavalry in a "rapid advance" never arose."
