The turning point

Finding the New Zealand Field Artillery again, three months after my last post, I find we are at the final decisive stages of the war.  'The Turning Point' chapter in New Zealand Artillery in the Field, 1914-18 begins noting the slow recovery of the British Armies (presumably including New Zealand) from the "smashing blows" the Germans had dealt in March and April but they had been completed, and the situation had changed:

The military situation on the Western Front at the beginning of August wore an outlook very different from the sombre uncertainty in which the future had been shrouded during those terrible days when the German divisions were sweeping forward with apparently irresistible impetus towards Amiens, and towards the Channel ports. .... The Franco-British Armies remained intact, and still barred the way to the coast. But the Germans still retained the initiative after the battles of the Somme and the Lys, despite their heavy commitments and heavy losses. The peril which menaced the Allied cause could not be said to have been effectually dispelled until after the definite collapse of the ambitious offensive launched by the enemy east and south-west of Rheims on July 15th, and the striking success of Marshal Foch's deliberately planned counter attack three days later on the front between Chateau Thierry and Soissons. That was the decisive turning point in the dramatic rush of events. The German army had made its great effort in the springtide of its strength, and the effort had failed. Thereafter the future of the Allied cause was no longer uncertain.

Retreat from Messines

The chapter 'The Retreat from Messines" in New Zealand Artillery in the Field, 1914-18 provides quite a detailed account of attack and counter-attack and difficulties faced by the Artillery around Messines from mid-March 1918. At this particular point 100 years ago, the history relates:

Several S.O.S. calls were answered during the day and evening of the 16th [April], and again next morning, when the enemy placed a heavy barrage along the front. Waggon lines at Westoutre were also shelled by hostile guns during the morning, resulting in a loss of men and horses, and the evacuation of the positions.
Forward observing officers kept closely in touch with the situation during the day, and batteries placed protective fire on threatened points, and engaged a great deal of enemy movement. The enemy brought up more guns, and hostile fire increased in volume, battery areas being severely shelled. The 5th Battery suffered heavy casualties during the morning of April 18th, losing two officers and five other ranks killed and twelve other ranks wounded; the battery was forced to evacuate the position, and as the other batteries were also coming under fire, the brigade withdrew to fresh positions.
By April 19th the front covered by the Brigade had been taken over by French troops, but the artillery in support was not withdrawn, and the brigade remained in the line supporting the French infantry until the 23rd, when all batteries were withdrawn to their waggon lines. The brigade proceeded the following day to the Staple area, where it remained in billets for three days. During this period sixty-three reinforcements and seventy remounts reached the brigade, and the guns were sent to the Ordnance Workshops for much-needed overhaul.
The brigade suffered heavy casualties during this brief period of active fighting, which besides being a severe trial on the endurance of the personnel at the guns and at the waggon lines, must be regarded as a most severe and searching, and in all respects successful, test of the initiative of commanding officers and their subordinates and of the efficiency of the whole brigade.

 

 

Prelude to the German Spring Offensive at Amiens

Around this time 100 years ago, Sydney Williams' war record shows he was transferred on 19 March 1918 to "Y" Battery from the "Z" Trench Mortar Battery to which he had been attached since August 1916.

Meanwhile, the New Zealand Artillery in the Field, 1914-18 records of this time say: 

The enemy displayed marked activity along the whole of the Ypres sector during March. ... hostile batteries were persistently active on forward areas, and there was a recrudescence of long range shelling in back areas. Anxiety was felt as to whether the heavy shelling of forward areas might not be the prelude to infantry action, and counter-preparation was ordered and fired in the early morning of the 10th, and on the three following mornings. There were constant alarms during the week that followed, but the tension remained unbroken until on the 21st March intelligence was received that the long-expected German offensive had been launched in the south. Details at first were meagre and, as always, rumours and vague reports of the most varied description sprang to life with a fecundity that is usual at such times. It was soon learnt, however, that the enemy had struck on a very wide front with tremendous weight, and that the situation was one of extreme gravity. On March 22nd Brigades and the D.A.C. were warned to be ready to move, and detailed instructions regarding reliefs were issued.

This was the beginning of the German bid for Amiens. 

Cleaning up - Winter in the Salient

As noted in the previous blog, the New Zealand Field Artillery had taken over new positions in the line at Ypres at the end of last year (1917). It was winter. There was much cleaning up to do, as the  New Zealand Artillery in the Field, 1914-18 says in 'Wintering in the Salient':

Many of the gun positions were in an indescribable condition; the pits were water-logged and innocent of approaches or decent platforms, and were littered about with empty charge cases, and odd piles of ammunition which seemed on the point of sinking out of sight in the mud. Too much could not be expected in an area where a prolonged period of heavy fighting had been followed by persistently bad weather; but improvements were possible, and steps were at once taken to have them effected. Pits were drained, cleaned up, and provided with weather-proof ammunition racks and stable platforms, and splinter-proof sleeping shelters were built for the crews. Before the hard weather came and bound the surface of the earth in its iron grip, nearly all the ammunition lying about the positions had been cleaned up, and most of the charge cases salved; .... All this was achieved, not in a day or a week, but after long and patient toil during the short daylight hours, and subject to the interruptions of enemy shelling. An immense amount of salving was done by the Division during these months, and the value of the material and ammunition collected from all parts of the sector ran into very big figures. Every waggon or ration cart that visited the forward areas returned with a load of material of some description, and every man in formed parties marching down from the line carried some small thing back to the "dump," where, in striking letters, was displayed a notice which queried of the passer-by what he had salved that day.
....
Platforms for the guns were constructed first, then command posts, shelter for the crews, ammunition pits, and, finally, some sort of overhead cover for the guns. ... The positions were being constructed on country which had been the scene of desperate fighting, and which was then but a wilderness of shell holes, half filled with water. It was heavy, tedious work, and often as the men dug they found grim reminders of the fighting that had ebbed and flowed on these slopes, in the unburied dead who had gradually sunk into the soft ground or had been half buried by the bursting shells.

Roads littered with broken waggons and ambulance carts

At this time 100 years ago, the New Zealand Division including Artillery were relieving British and Australian troops in the line at Ypres. The New Zealand 2nd Army Brigade rejoined the rest of the Division on about 6 December, after having spent several months serving at Nieuport near the coast.

Sydney Williams war record says he rejoined 'Z' Trench Mortar Battery on 3 November from hospital. However it is unclear from excerpt below from New Zealand Artillery in the Field, 1914-18, just where he was - with the Batteries being numbered.

The New Zealand Field Artillery moved into the line in support of their own troops in the first week in December. Batteries being still without guns, the gunners were taken up from Boeschepe in motor lorries, and took over the guns of the artillery then covering the Division. In this manner the 1^stPAGE 206Brigade (less the 15th Battery, which did not go into action until some few days later) relieved the 14th Brigade, R.F.A.; the 2nd (Army) Brigade, which had returned from the Belgian coast at the end of November, relieved the 3rd Australian Field Artillery Brigade; and the 3rd Brigade relieved the 18th Brigade, R.F.A. The relief was completed by December 6th. The Brigades covering the Division were grouped as follows:— "B" Group—2nd Brigade and 52nd Brigade R.F.A., under Lieut.-Colonel Sykes; "C" Group—3rd Brigade, under Lieut.-Colonel Falla; "D" Group—1st Brigade, under Lieut.-Colonel Symon. Headquarters of "B" Group were at the Tuilleries, of "C" Group at Halfway House, and of "D" Group at Hooge Crater. 

The prospect of wintering in the salient was faced with the philosophic acceptance of events that becomes a characteristic of the soldier. The men were nearly all quite familiar with the nature of the country, but the scene that unfolded itself as they left the lorries at the Birr Cross Roads, and proceeded on foot to the battery positions, was forbidding in the extreme. The way lay through the country over which the attacking divisions had fought their way in the Third Battle of Ypres, and on every hand the fighting had left its indelible impress. Nothing had been left untouched by the shell storms that had swept up and down and over every inch of the land. The roads, so busy through the long hours of darkness, were deserted by day and were littered on either side with broken waggons and limbers and ambulance carts, and all the wreckage of transport and material that accumulates along a road line during heavy fighting. Batteries of the 1st Brigade were situated about the slopes forward from Hooge Crater; the 9th and 6th (Howitzer) Batteries of the 2nd Brigade were near Glencorse Wood, and the 2nd and 5th, with the 12th Battery of the 3rd Brigade, were on the left of Westhoek; the remaining batteries of the 3rd Brigade, the 11th, 13th, and 4th (howitzer) were very close together near the Westhoek Cross Roads.

Passchendaele - 12 October 1917

As New Zealand History online says, "Passchendaele has been a byword for the horror of the Great War. In terms of lives lost in a single day, the failed attack on Bellevue Spur on 12 October was probably the greatest disaster in New Zealand’s history." The day left 843 New Zealand soldiers dead or mortally wounded, and a total of 2730 casualties (killed or wounded).

I have been following the lead-up to the battle in New Zealand Artillery in the Field, 1914-18. As many will know, heavy rain in early October had left the area a muddy quagmire - providing atrocious conditions, and difficulty moving men, machines and animals. New Zealand History online says, "An attack on 9 October by British and Australian troops was to open the way for II ANZAC Corps to capture Passchendaele on the 12th. The plan failed. Without proper preparation and in the face of strong German resistance, the 9 October attack collapsed with heavy casualties."

Yet despite this, and the weather conditions becoming worse, "orders were at once issued for a renewal of the attack on the 12th, and instructions concerning the artillery support were received by the New Zealand Brigades on the afternoon of the 10th," according to New Zealand Artillery in the Field (published in 1922). It went on to sum up the situation on the 11 October:

 

Apart from the difficulties of haulage, the constant blocking of the roads by heavy guns caused a great deal of delay, and hung up the transport of ammunition as well as the moving of the guns. Only a small percentage of the guns had been brought forward, and they were without platforms to keep them from sinking in the mud. The situation was distinctly unpromising, but all had been done that was humanly possible in the time and under the conditions. The situation was such, however, that Brigadier-General Johnston, C.R.A. of the New Zealand Division, reported to both the Divisional and Corps Commanders that they could not depend on the artillery for the attack on the following day.

The account of the day is headed 'The Tragedy of October 12th", and includes:

Very heavy casualties had been suffered by both Brigades of Infantry which took part in the attack; the losses in killed and wounded numbered 2730. Communications were utterly disorganised, the greatest difficulty was experienced in getting rations and water to the men in the forward areas, and the condition of the wounded was pitiable in the extreme. Many lay all night in the mud, exposed to the hail and rain and the bitter cold....
From the moment the attack opened, the artillery barrage was weak and patchy as a direct result of the conditions under which the guns had to shoot; but this deficiency, though serious in itself, was not the chief factor in the tragic failure. The primary causes of the failure of the attack were the deep and continuous belts of uncut wire which faced the attacking infantry, and the massive concrete blockhouses, or pill-boxes, from which the enemy machine gunners shot down everything that moved. In short, it was lack of preparation. The Division was supported in the attack, in addition to heavy artillery, by eight brigades of field artillery, which totalled one hundred and forty-four 18-prs. and forty-eight 4.5in. howitzers. Some of these were still blocked on the road when the attack opened, and in the case of those that had reached the forward positions, the ground was so soft and water-logged that the guns simply sank up to the axles after the first few shots had been fired, and in some cases before a shot had been fired. The provision of stable platforms is an essential to good shooting at any time; but on the 12th it was only by desperate expedients that guns were kept in action at all. All the New Zealand batteries fired in the barrage; the gunners secured logs, odd bits of timber, anything, in fact, that would provide a foundation, and so contrived to keep their guns in action. ...

Despite the fact that the artillery was almost reduced to total immobility and that even movement on foot was a matter of extreme difficulty, orders were actually issued to certain batteries about this time regarding the provision of mobile sections of 18-prs. in readiness to co-operate in case of a rapid advance on the front by cavalry. And this at a time when even unburdened animals became so hopelessly bogged that extrication became impossible and they had to be destroyed. 

Fortunately, "the opportunity of assisting the cavalry in a "rapid advance" never arose."

One week before Messines - "incessant and destructive fire"

From New Zealand Artillery in the Field, 1914-18, one week before the attack on Messines Ridge, things turn more brutal and incessant. When one thinks of how many wars of various scales have been waged since these events 100 years ago - it is such an incredible waste of machine power and human lives:

On the last day in May most of the batteries spent some time cleaning up uncut wire in their zones, and by the end of the day all the wire within wire-cutting range in group zones was reported cut. From 6 a.m. this day onwards fire was maintained continuously, day and night, on all roads, bridges, communication trenches, light railway junctions, and transport halting places on the front. Thus there was no road or approach by which the enemy could transport stores or ammunition, or bring up reliefs for his weary and harassed infantry without being subject to this incessant and destructive fire. What mental and physical agony this meant when prolonged for over a week may readily be conjectured. The enemy guns were very active during the night of June 1, Hyde Park Corner, where there was always much traffic, being persistently shelled. A practice barrage with 75 per cent. of the guns only, was fired on June 2nd, and the same night the German positions in front of Messines were liberally gas-shelled. The weather continued bright and warm, and practice barrages were fired again on the 3rd and 5th. On the 3rd enemy planes were active low down over battery positions and Ploegsteert Wood was heavily shelled; but on the 5th hostile fire was particularly severe and effective. The positions of three batteries of the 311th Brigade, R.F.A., which were attached to "G" Group, were shelled practically all day. About 1,300 rounds of ammunition were destroyed, and the position was almost burnt out. The personnel were withdrawn, but returned at 3 p.m. to take part in the corps practice barrage. Two minutes after this practice barrage started the men of one battery had to evacuate the position, owing to the danger from burning ammunition dumps in rear. All the rations and stores were destroyed, and the exploding ammunition put no fewer than five guns out of action. On the following day "G" Group did not fire as the positions, several of which were very exposed, were still being shelled at intervals, and it was not desired to give them completely away before the attack. 

From June 1st the daily expenditure of ammunition had been 150 rounds per gun and howitzer, and this expenditure continued right up to the day of attack. Prior to the assault there was to be no intense bombardment and no departure from what had been for some time the normal and customary procedure in the daily and nightly attention given to the enemy. It was a critical moment in the consummation of the scheme—the hour preceding its tumultuous birth—and anything that might give the vigilant German mind any idea of the hour of the attack was to be rigorously avoided. "It is essential," said the order on the subject, "that there should be no increase or slackening in the rate of fire before zero hour, and that everything should appear normal." Such was the density of the smoke and dust resulting from the ceaseless shelling of the enemy front that the whole countryside was completely hidden from aerial observation. A cessation of fire was in consequence ordered for fifteen minutes each day, to allow aeroplane photographs to be taken.